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A PROSECUTOR’S EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER 
PADILLA 
ROBERT M. A. JOHNSON* 
Collateral consequences have been imposed on offenders from the 
beginning of this country.  The significance of these consequences has grown 
as additional consequences have been added and criminalization of conduct 
has increased.  These consequences, imposed by law upon conviction, are, 
however, not uniformly considered by prosecutors in charging or plea 
bargaining.  With over 2,300 elected prosecutors and thousands of assistant 
prosecutors exercising discretion as to how justice might be achieved in a 
particular situation,1 it should be no surprise significant variation exists in their 
decisions.  Some prosecutors give no consideration to such consequences, 
while others may carefully consider the impact of a conviction upon an 
offender. 
Inconsistency in prosecution policy and judgment is the product of the 
structure of prosecution systems in the fifty states.  Each state creates its own 
structure.  In some states, elected prosecutors and their assistants only have 
responsibility for criminal prosecution.2  In these offices, they may have 
jurisdiction in all matters from traffic offenses to homicides.  In other states, 
the elected prosecutor may also have corporate counsel responsibilities.3 
The offices also vary significantly in size.  Large offices, like the Los 
Angeles County prosecutor, may have a thousand assistants.4  In very small 
counties with a population of a few thousand, the prosecutor is a single part-
 
* Past President of the National District Attorneys Association, Past Chair of the American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section, and former Anoka County Attorney, Anoka County, 
Minnesota. 
 1. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001 
11 app. (2002). 
 2. See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR, 
May/June 1997, at 33, 36. 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.100 (1997) 
(amended 2008). 
 4. L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, PREPARING FOR A CAREER AS A DEPUTY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY (2011), available at http://da.co.la.ca.us/pdf/career.pdf. 
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time position.5  A very significant percentage of prosecutors’ offices are 
composed of a few attorneys or less.6 
Because of this remarkably decentralized elected prosecution system, there 
is little organized effort to develop consistent or progressive criminal justice 
policy.  While elected prosecutors in nearly every state participate in a state 
prosecutors’ organization, most of their efforts are focused on advocacy 
training or lobbying their legislatures for or against legislation that “improves” 
the criminal laws in their state.  The reality of the system, dominated by small 
offices pressed to simply resolve cases and led by elected prosecutors who may 
have little experience in criminal justice matters, militates against the 
development of thoughtful policy.  This prosecution structure results in uneven 
and delayed adoption of developments in criminal justice policy and law.  
Policy developments in areas like child abuse and domestic abuse moved 
slowly and unevenly across the country and are not fully embraced even now.7  
Scientific developments, like DNA analysis and use, had similar problems 
being accepted.8  The acceptance of reentry practices and use of evidence-
based practices, which hold great promise to reduce recidivism, are subject to 
the same problems.  So, too, is the recognition of how collateral consequences 
are an important factor in achieving justice and improving public safety.9  
Nevertheless, even with the difficulties presented by the structure of our 
prosecution system, there now exists an opportunity to do both, justice and 
improve public safety.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky 
will have both a direct and indirect influence on prosecutors’ consideration of 
collateral consequences.10  In order to consider fully how the Court’s decision 
influences prosecutors’ actions, the responsibilities of prosecutors in 
discretionary decisions must be considered. 
Traditionally, prosecutors are guided in exercising their discretion by 
criminal justice standards and court decisions.11  These authorities call on 
 
 5. DEFRANCES, supra note 1, at 2 tbl.2. 
 6. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 3 
tbl.2 (2006) (showing that prosecutors’ offices serving a population of under 250,000 employed 
on average three attorneys). 
 7. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the 
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, & the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 14–16 (1999). 
 8. Travis C. Pratt et al., This Isn’t CSI: Estimating the National Backlog of Forensic DNA 
Cases and the Barriers Associated with Case Processing, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 32, 33 
(2006). 
 9. Hon. Ron Spears, Foreseeing the “Four C’s” (Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions), 98 ILL. B.J. 432, 432 (2010). 
 10. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); see also Spears, supra note 9, at 433. 
 11. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Standards 3-1.2(b), 3-3.4 (3d ed. 1993); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 
Standards 43.1, 44.1 (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 1991); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935). 
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prosecutors to seek justice, not merely to convict offenders.12  In seeking 
justice, however, prosecutors are charged with the question of what justice 
itself entails.  “Justice” in any particular situation is fact specific.  The primary 
objectives of felony sentencing are protecting the public from future crime by 
the offender and punishing the offender.13  However, each circumstance of an 
offense may be different.14  Each offender is, by their very nature, unique.15  
The question is what aspects of the offense and what aspects of the offender 
should be considered in achieving “justice.” 
In order to appreciate the importance of this question, the power of the 
prosecutor in our criminal justice system must be appreciated.  There is no 
more noteworthy position in the common law criminal justice system than the 
prosecutor.  Police may detain and jail offenders, but no serious criminal 
matter may proceed to conviction without the decision of a prosecutor to bring 
charges.16  By the crime charged, a prosecutor greatly influences sentencing 
and, if the prosecutor charges and convicts a person of a crime carrying a 
mandatory minimum, the prosecutor effectively sentences the person 
convicted.17  Prosecutorial discretion in charging and later plea bargaining has 
become the primary method of determining guilt and sentencing.18 
Generally speaking, there is no appeal from the decision of a prosecutor.19  
Of course, if a person is found not guilty following a trial, the prosecutor’s 
decision is effectively reversed, but such a result occurs in a very small number 
of the cases charged.20  Every day, thousands of decisions are made by 
prosecutors as to what crime to charge or what is an acceptable plea.  Often, a 
number of crimes may be charged out of one incident, and a plea may be made 
 
 12. See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1.1 (“The primary responsibility of 
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.”). 
 13. Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead of 
Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002). 
 14. Id. at 15. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Jacoby, supra note 2, at 33. 
 17. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 877 (2009). 
 18. See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla 
v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 23. 
 19. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the 
Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.  ‘[S]o long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.’” (citations omitted)). 
 20. DIR. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
U.S. COURTS 242 tbl.D-4 (2010) (showing that of the U.S. District Court cases in 2010 not 
dismissed or disposed by plea agreement, 423 individuals were acquitted by either the court or 
jury compared to 2,323 individuals who were convicted by either the court or jury). 
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to any of a number of crimes arising out of that incident.  The decision of what 
crime to charge or what crime to plead to is one for the prosecutor alone. 
With all this power in the criminal justice system, the question of what the 
prosecutor should consider in trying to achieve justice becomes particularly 
important.  Historically, many prosecutors have limited their consideration of 
consequences of a criminal conviction to those within the authority of a judge 
at sentencing.21  They will consider the crime of conviction with similar crimes 
carrying alternate potential sentences.  In some jurisdictions, prosecutors may 
limit the length of incarceration in jail or prison or bargain for particular 
conditions of probation.22  They typically will not, and often have no authority 
to, negotiate civil consequences of a conviction outside the authority of a judge 
to impose at sentencing.23 
The view that civil consequences of a conviction are beyond the 
consideration of a judge at sentencing or a prosecutor in charging or plea 
bargaining has long had the support of courts.24  Additionally, the ability of a 
judge to impose a sentence that effectively addresses reducing recidivism is 
greatly reduced by the increasingly limited information available about the 
offender and their needs.25  Such facts ignore the reality of civil consequences 
for an offender.  The civil consequences of a criminal conviction are often far 
greater than any consequence imposed by a judge at sentencing.26 
These consequences are both formal and informal.  Informal consequences 
impact the ability of a person convicted of a crime to find employment, 
housing, and many other opportunities influenced by the public nature of 
criminal records.27  These informal consequences, as real as they are, are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Formal civil consequences of a criminal 
 
 21. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2470 (2004). 
 22. See, e.g., People v. Winston, 737 N.E.2d 304, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); see also Gabriel 
J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (stating it is typical for an individual pleading 
guilty for the first time without jail time, but with some collateral consequences). 
 23. See generally Ethan V. Torrey, Note, “The Dignity of Crimes”: Judicial Removal of 
Aliens and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187 (1999). 
 24. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491–92 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing 
Chin & Holmes, supra note 22, at 699 (noting that virtually all jurisdictions including eleven 
federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia hold that defense counsel 
need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction)). 
 25. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practice to Reduce Recidivism: Implications for State 
Judiciaries 30–33 (Mar. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.be 
press.com/roger_warren/1. 
 26. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 253 (2002). 
 27. Christopher Uggen, Dirty Bombs and Garbage Cases, 74 SOC. RES. 707, 707 (2007). 
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conviction are erected by statute or rule as a result of a conviction.28  Such 
consequences range from insignificant disqualifications, for example, 
prohibiting offenders from employment they do not seek, to life changing 
actions, such as deporting offenders to a country they have known nothing of 
since they were a toddler.29  It may mean sex offender registration, effectively 
ostracizing an offender from society, or something as simple but significant as 
revoking a driver’s license.30  Consequences such as these have grown over the 
years to the degree that any person convicted of a felony faces hundreds of 
such consequences.31  This separation from society by law and rule is to the 
degree that it has been labeled “civil death” in some states.32 
The question continues as to whether these consequences should be 
considered by prosecutors in their pursuit of justice?  Some prosecutors, of 
course, do consider these consequences whether driven by their own values or 
by defense counsel.  By choice of crime of conviction, they may avoid 
deportation, sex offender registration, gun possession, or other consequences 
which may disproportionately affect an offender.33  There is no definitive 
answer to this question.  The view that collateral consequences should not be 
considered in the charging and resolution of a criminal case is about to change.  
The Court’s decision in Padilla confirmed years of work and recommendations 
by various national organizations seeking collateral consequences to be 
addressed by all members of the criminal justice system, including 
prosecutors.34 
Beginning early in 1997, the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar 
Association recognized the significance of collateral consequences.35  The 
Section undertook to address the significance of these consequences to public 
 
 28. See Chin & Love, supra note 18, at 24 (listing numerous statutes that affect rights of 
convicts). 
 29. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2)(E)(xx) (2006) (outlining the inability of convicted 
criminals to be hired as teachers); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
 30. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14.3.2(f) 
cmt. (3d ed. 1999). 
 31. See, e.g., THE REENTRY OF EX-OFFENDERS CLINIC, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF LAW, A 
REPORT ON THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN MARYLAND 
(2007). 
 32. Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 & n.13 (2002). 
 33. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011). 
 34. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 35. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14.3.2(f) (“To 
the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in 
advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from 
entry of the contemplated plea.”). 
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safety.36  As the collateral consequences project evolved, the Section began 
working on Criminal Justice Standards for Collateral Consequences.37  It 
understood the weight and numbers of civil consequences had grown but were 
not considered in the processing of a criminal case.38  This action was one of 
the first recognitions of the significance of collateral consequences on public 
safety.39 
Additional recognition of the burden of collateral consequences is found in 
the Report of the National Reentry Council produced by the Council of State 
Governments.40  This report focused on increasing public safety by decreasing 
recidivism.41  It recognized the barriers to offenders’ reentry and suggested 
methods to help offenders reenter society.42  As an important aspect of the 
reentry effort, collateral consequences are recognized as a problem to be 
overcome. 
Efforts of both the ABA and the Council of State Governments continued 
the attention on collateral consequences.  As recognition of the barriers that 
collateral consequences imposed on offenders’ efforts to reintegrate increased, 
states worked to find a balance between appropriate visibility of criminal 
records and the problems such visibility caused in preventing reentry.43  The 
ABA Criminal Justice Section continued its work by creating the Commission 
on Effective Criminal Sanctions.44  This commission developed several 
policies that were endorsed by the National District Attorneys Association and 
approved by the ABA House of Delegates.45  Among the policies adopted were 
the following: that government agencies should inventory and repeal 
employment restrictions not specifically related to the employment of the 
individual or that would protect public safety;46 establishment of judicial or 
administrative methods for mitigating or relieving collateral consequences 
 
 36. See generally Warren, supra note 25, at 7–8 (emphasizing effective sentences should 
strive to promote public safety). 
 37. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004). 
 38. Id. at intro. 
 39. Id. 
 40. THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, CHARTING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF 
PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY 406–07 (2005), available at http://reentrypolicy.org/publica 
tions/1694;file. 
 41. Id. at 26, 33–34. 
 42. Id. at xviii–xx. 
 43. ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 103D 2–4 (2007). 
 44. ABA Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions, REENTRY.NET, www.reentry.net/li 
brary/attachment.149448 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 103C 1 (2007). 
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imposed by law, and standards by which a person should be judged for such 
relief;47 and that prosecutors should be advised of the potential collateral 
consequences associated with a particular plea.48 
All this work led to the adoption by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of a Uniform Law on Collateral 
Consequences.49  This Act, the Uniform Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction Act (hereinafter “Uniform Act”), addressed a number of issues 
regarding the imposition of collateral consequences.50  Among other things, the 
Uniform Act addresses the treatment of consequences as former offenders 
move from state to state,51 permits a judge to relieve an offender from a 
specific collateral consequence at sentencing,52 and permits relief from all state 
collateral consequences after a period of time if certain findings are made.53  
Additionally, the Uniform Act operates as a resource guide for both defense 
counsel and prosecutors by allowing each to easily consider collateral 
consequences when bargaining and charging.54 
Pulling all these efforts together, the ABA Criminal Justice Section, 
working under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, is identifying and 
collecting into a searchable data base the collateral consequences in all fifty 
states.55  Currently, over 25,000 statutes have been identified containing 
collateral consequences.56  When completed, defenders and prosecutors will be 
able to identify these consequences and address them in determining an 
appropriate plea. 
Thus, the stage was set for the Court’s opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.57  In 
Padilla, the Court found the deportation of the defendant to be of such 
consequence that defense counsel must advise their client of the deportation 
consequences of a conviction to fulfill their responsibility to provide 
reasonable effective assistance of counsel.58  In doing so, the Court recognized 
“[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close 
 
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 103E 1 (2007). 
 49. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010). 
 50. Id. at prefatory note. 
 51. Id. § 9. 
 52. Id. § 10. 
 53. Id. § 11. 
 54. Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky: 
Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., 
Summer 2010, at 36, 42. 
 55. Adult Collateral Consequences Project, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.accproject.org/in 
dex.cfm (last updated Feb. 5, 2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 58. Id. at 1486. 
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connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a 
direct or a collateral consequence.”59 
As a number of Justices spoke to the issue in Padilla, they recognized the 
significance of collateral consequences beyond deportation.60  In addition to 
Justice Stevens acknowledgement of the blurred line between collateral and 
direct consequences of a conviction and the importance of both to the 
accused,61 Justices Alito and Scalia commented on how the principal the Court 
adopted could easily be applied to other collateral consequences.62  All of the 
Justices, including those dissenting from the opinion, recognized that in at least 
a perfect world, all serious collateral consequences would be addressed by 
counsel prior to entering a guilty plea.63 
The efforts of the American Bar Association, in conjunction with other 
similar national organizations, may have influenced the Court in its recognition 
of how significant collateral consequences have become in criminal cases.64  
This recognition by the Court in Padilla will influence prosecutors in their own 
deliberations to weigh the collateral consequences of a particular conviction as 
opposed to a different resolution of a case.  Surely, prosecutors will 
individually and collectively begin to discuss how these consequences might 
be considered.  However “justice” might be defined by a prosecutor, the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of the importance of collateral consequences to a 
just resolution of a matter should influence a prosecutor’s views. 
Beyond prosecutors undertaking a weighing of the collateral consequences 
of a conviction on their own initiative, there will be a number of external 
forces causing prosecutors to undertake consideration of collateral 
consequences.  A primary agent forcing such consideration is the defense 
attorney.  Under Padilla, defenders must advise of possible deportation 
consequences.65  From deportation consequences, it is a very small step to 
advising an accused of other possible consequences.  Several Justices in the 
Padilla decision seemed to say that advice beyond deportation consequences 
was required to fully represent an accused.66  In Bauder v. Department of 
Corrections, the court applied Padilla to civil commitment cases.67  Here, the 
defendant had been misadvised regarding his eligibility for civil commitment 
 
 59. Id. at 1482. 
 60. Id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 1482, 1483 (majority opinion). 
 62. Id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1496–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64. See id. at 1482–83 (majority opinion); see also Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
 65. Padilla, 130 S. Ct at 1486. 
 66. See id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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during plea negotiations.68  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
civil commitment was a collateral consequence of a sex offense condition, and 
counsel had an obligation to advise his client appropriately to such.69 
Once advice is given by a defender regarding collateral consequences and 
an accused strongly and reasonably objects to a particular collateral 
consequence of conviction, presumably the defender will seek to avoid a 
conviction that carries that particular collateral consequence.  As the defender 
discusses possible plea bargains with the prosecutor, the issue of collateral 
consequences is put into play.  Though be it indirectly, this will force the 
prosecutor to consider the matter and, if a resolution is to be reached, an 
accommodation should be reached.  In Padilla, the Court discusses such a 
situation.70  By addressing collateral consequences during plea negotiations, 
both sides are benefitted.  The prosecution gains leverage through the powerful 
incentive for the defendant to plead guilty to an offense that doesn’t mandate 
such consequences, while the defense may help his client avoid such 
consequences.71 
Legislation may play a significant role in facilitating the resolution of cases 
in which collateral consequences are preventing such resolutions.  The 
Uniform Act, if adopted by a state legislature, would permit a judge at 
sentencing to waive a state collateral consequence.72  If given that authority by 
the legislature, prosecutors and defenders, subject to the discretion of the judge 
accepting the plea, will likely be better able to craft a plea bargain which will 
be a just resolution of the case. 
Judges will also influence prosecutors to consider collateral consequences 
in their charging and plea bargaining.  Some judges currently sentence or allow 
withdrawal of pleas if they believe the collateral consequences are unjust.  
Because a conviction would have caused deportation, a judge allowed 
withdrawal of a plea in Minnesota after the prison sentence was served and 
then challenged the prosecutor to try the case.73  In another case, defense 
counsel tried a case to the court in the face of overwhelming evidence when 
the judge indicated she found deportation too severe and a virtually automatic 
a consequence.74  The trial court issued multiple orders of continuance for 
 
 68. Id. at 1273. 
 69. Id. at 1274–75. 
 70. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 71. Id. 
 72. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 9 (2010). 
 73. E-mail from Robert M.A. Johnson, Fmr. Anoka County Attorney, to Robbie J. Hinz, 
Managing Editor, Saint Louis University Public Law Review (Jan. 19, 2012, 08:07 CST) (on file 
with author). 
 74. State v. Selyukov, Nos. C5-00-1617, C9-00-1619, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 144, at *1-3 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001). 
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dismissal because deportation was the consequence of a conviction.75  In 
Minnesota, the prosecutors asked the legislature to moderate sex offender 
registration in juvenile matters because judges were simply finding cases not 
proven when they thought registration was too onerous.76  As judges become 
more familiar from defender advocacy, they will influence prosecutors to 
engage in an effort to appropriately deal with collateral consequences. 
As the lower courts and individuals within the criminal justice system 
become more familiar with the requirements of Padilla, the duties of each 
participant in the system will change, in some cases dramatically.  The 
prosecutor’s duty to the offender may come to incorporate a duty to inform the 
offender of collateral consequences when they are proceeding pro se, similar to 
other procedural information.  Given Justice Alito’s concurrence, it is unclear 
how far this duty will extend.77  Defendants, under Justice Alito’s discussion, 
have their own duty to get definitive answers regard these issues and are 
thought to have assumed the risk of collateral consequences where they do not 
seek such answers.78  Judges and prosecutors alike should and will seek to 
have a discussion of collateral consequences added to the plea agreement or 
plea colloquy.  By doing so, each will not only have a stronger argument for 
preserving a guilty plea but will have a better opportunity to find justice. 
This evolution of thinking, the consideration of collateral consequences, 
will be recognized as important to finding justice.  In addition to finding 
justice, such consideration will improve public safety as offenders find a 
productive place in society.  This effort will require legislative action adopting 
the Uniform Act and recognition by prosecutors that justice requires dealing 




 75. Id. at *7 (reversing the continuances in the absence of “special circumstances” of clear 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 76. See generally H.R. 1019, 2007 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2007); E-mail from John P. 
Kingrey, Exec. Dir., Minnesota County Attorneys Association, to Robert M.A. Johnson, Fmr. 
Anoka County Attorney (Jan. 19, 2012, 04:57 CST) (on file with author). 
 77. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487–94 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. at 1494. 
